项目名称： eleJudge电子合同快速裁判系统
项目类型： 商业盈利类
项目介绍：
如果我们的区块链只是追赶别人的步伐，那比较难成长为领先世界的公链。
当今的区块链在Defi上获得了巨大的成功，它在保留去中心化本质的前提下，解决了借贷的需求，交易的需求，理财的需求。但区块链的未来仅仅只是金融么？未来去中心化的免信任的区块链将以更高的深度，更多地深入到人们的生活中去，改善社会的信任关系，提高社会的运转效率。
将区块链的优势与我们的实际生产结合在一起，正是我今天所要阐述的议题。
我申请开发电子合同快速裁判系统（eleJudge），通过智能合约达到程序正义、流程透明、专业公正的纠纷处理，免除中间环节，大幅降低社会经济类纠纷维权成本，缩短维权时间，维护现代社会的契约精神，快速公正解决纠纷问题。
eleJudge合同签订方以钱包地址作为合同要素，以智能合约签署合同，合同签署后甲方待付币数量将质押在智能合约当中，合同完成后，合同相关方在无争议情况下，确定最终支付币，发起支付申请，待相关方确认后，完成支付。
在相关方有争议时，需采用快速审判制度。
比较中西方审判制度差异，西方采用陪审团制度，通过随机抽选没有利益关系的陪审员，且采取信息隔离手段确保合同相关方没有条件与陪审员单独接触，造成贿赂，通过陪审团制度，以普通人的心智、良知保证司法实现普通人的政治诉求。但从司法实践上来看，在现代社会，各个领域需要的专业知识越来越多，随机挑选的陪审团的专业素养不够，无法清晰理解法律相关条文，而且诉讼时间经济成本十分巨大，目前美国州司法体系，直接通过辩诉交易达成的诉讼已高达94%，而且个别全球知名的例如辛普森谋杀案，从侧面反应了陪审团制度的失灵。
我国采用专业法官组成的合议庭，加上人民陪审员的制度，奇数制投票表决，一人一票，确保司法工作的专业行和公正性。
考虑各种现实场景的复杂性，eleJudge系统将采用两个子品牌，eleJudge-Pro,和eleJudge-Dec，其中eleJudge-Pro采用专业审判员制度，通过DAO组织挑选符合条件的审判员，建立专业审判员队伍库,eleJudge-Dec采用开放式的陪审团制度，用户质押通证即可得到陪审团资格。
相关方争议时，由任一相关方发起审判请求，审判请求发起后，智能合约系统将随机挑选9名已提交质押金，等待审判案件的审判员，9名审判员需在7天内完成审判，审判时间内，审判员可组织文字、图片、视频、实地等多种方式公开与合同相关方交流，合同相关方提交资料，审判员根据已有的资料，做出判决结果，但不能以合同相关方不参加会议为由，做出惩罚性判决。
审判员将与合同相关方公开交流结束后，其中任一名审判员可发起审判结论。审判结论里写明各方待支付和收到的金额，审判结论交由9名审判员表决达成多数票通过后，智能合约支付金额给各方。
系统对审判员的审判时间有经济上的激励，但如果有审判员无法在规定时限内对最后一次提案（最后一次提案如在规定时限快结束时提出，会有24小时的延长期，延长期内无法再提新提案）做出投票,智能合约将自动没收未提案的审判员抵押金，并取消审判员资格，而本场审判将以审判员提案未获反对多数既可以通过，若所有审判员始终无法达成一致意见（反对占多数），无法维护判决结果的确定性，造成社会纠纷成本变大，智能合约将自动没收该场审判所有审判员的抵押金。合同相关方可选择再次发起审判，解决争议问题。
考虑大部分合同将可能涉及隐私问题，所以涉及的签署文件等材料，系统将提供加密方式进行存储，合同相关方需保留密钥。
考虑合同支付方可能主动会与审判员私下交流，达成行贿的情况，给合同金额增加1%的诚信金，在审判发起前，9名审判员其中一名若发现合同支付方有私下交流情况，可剥夺诚信金。
考虑审判员可能主动向合同相关方私下交流，达成索贿的目的，并且审判员可能会有摸鱼的现象，若出现这种情况，用户可以申请向9名审判员申诉，以2/3投票中止审判员资格，并剥夺质押金。
合同纠纷的审判权力全部由审判员决定，DAO组织无权干预。
DAO组织将由投票决定审判员的人选，为防止投票人出于一己私利，DAO组织应尽量满足多样性，分散化要求。
考虑支付方可能通过其中某一个相关方转移质押资金的行为，逃避合同责任，系统不应支持支付方与其中单独一个相关方达到协议，所以用户在签署合同时应考虑清楚相关方的协调一致难度，尽量分开多个合同文件签署。
考虑代币支付方可能在合同运行过程中，增加支付币数量，系统需提供入口供支付方提高质押代币数量。
考虑合同执行过程中，会有合同文件及中间过程的签字文件，可能涉及多方或者一方签字，全过程记录在案。
所有文件以ipfs方式存储，保证所有文件无法篡改。
我们鼓励合同相关方自行解决较小的分歧，因为自行解决的社会成本实际上是最低的，但合同相关方可能会因较小的分歧，频繁发起审判请求，造成审判员不堪重负。所以系统将对发起审判的合同，需支付合同金额2%的审判金。（具体的比例应与合同类型相适应）
审判员平分审判金作为报酬（可能未来考虑将一部分的DAO组织奖励转换为审判员报酬），审判员同一时间内最多接3个审判案。
所有经过eleJudge系统的合同将保留0.5%的资金作为DAO组织奖励。
考虑合同金额的大小，未来应有审判员数量的变化，最少1人（小金额简单合同），最多15人。考虑只有一个审判员会存在可能的个人利益问题（多人沟通下，更容易消除个人利益），系统应尽量采用至少3人的审判模式。
考虑合同类型的不同，未来应有不同语言、不同类型的审判员分组（同一审判员需可以进入多个分组）。
考虑购物等通用型合同场景，未来可以制作通用模板接口供商家接入，形成更为快速便捷的纠纷处理机制。
DAO组织仅在审判员入场时，考察审判员的专业能力，在入场后，DAO组织没有权力撤换审判员。仅由审判员团体自己决定审判员的去留，赋予审判员团体自行发展的权力。
eleJudge相比传统模式的优势：
1、合同交易双方质押资金到智能合约，不存在传统机构的中心化节点问题，无须信任DAO组织，不会出现质押资金遗失的问题。无争议情况下，合同相关方自行支付所有金额。在这一点上，eleJudge是完全去中心化并且免信任的。
2、在有争议情况下，普通人可能更贴近社会公正，但因为现代社会的各专业种类之间存在巨大的认知差距，没有相关专业知识的人对复杂专业问题进行审判，在一定程度上，相当于掷色子碰运气，因此我们需要专业的审判员，而专业的审判员，是否足够专业与公正，必须由一个人或组织进行认定，因此在这一部分会存在部分中心化的节点问题。
3、为了降低中心化节点导致的问题，（1）在组织结构上，eleJudge采用了去中心化的DAO组织形式；并要求DAO组织中没有一个人能占据1/20的份额。采用多人投票表决的方式，遏制个人利益造成的冲突。（2）在权利分配上，审判员决定案件的审判结果，DAO组织无权干涉。DAO组织只能决定审判员是否入选，而不能取消审判员资格。（3）在审判员人选上，采用随机算法，防止审判员与合同相关方窜通。
4、无论审判结果如何，DAO组织无法将合同金额据为己有，只能通过审判，在合同相关方之间支付合同金额。
5、eleJudge系统的审判效率会大大提升，而且有最长时间的限制存在，加速社会纠纷的处理效率。
6、以上所述的所有流程、对权力的制约，对义务未完成的惩罚执行，均以智能合约进行固化，没有任何人能够更改。
eleJudge以去中心化代替中心化，以程式化代替人治化，用制度制约各方权力，我相信将是未来经济类纠纷处理的有效解决方案。
Electronic contract quick judge system - eleJudge
Today’s blockchain has achieved great success on Defi. While retaining the decentralized nature, it has solved the needs of borrowing, transaction, and deposit management. But is the future of blockchain only financial? In the future, the decentralized trust-free blockchain will penetrate more deeply into people’s lives, improve social trust relationships, and increase the efficiency of social efficiency.
Combining the advantages of the blockchain with our actual life is exactly what I want to discuss today.
I applied for the development of an electronic contract quick judgment system (eleJudge), which achieves procedural justice, process transparency, and professional and fair dispute resolution through smart contracts, eliminating middle links, greatly reducing the cost of protecting rights in social and economic disputes, shortening the time of protecting rights, and maintaining contracts in modern society Spiritually, resolve disputes quickly and fairly.
The signer of the contract takes the wallet address as the contract element, and signs the contract with the Smart Contract. After the contract is signed, the amount of coins to be paid by Party A will be pledged in the Smart Contract. After the contract is completed, the parties involved in the contract will determine the final payment currency without disputes. Initiate a payment application, and complete the payment after confirmation by the relevant parties.
When there is a dispute between related parties, a rapid trial system is required.
Comparing the differences between the civil law system and the common law system, the civil law system randomly selects jurors who have no interest relationship, and adopts information isolation methods to ensure that the parties involved in the contract have no conditions to contact the jurors alone, resulting in bribery. The jury system uses the mind and conscience of ordinary people to ensure that justice fulfills ordinary people’s political demands. However, from the perspective of judicial practice, in modern society, more and more professional knowledge is required in various fields. The jury selected at random is not professional enough to clearly understand the relevant provisions of the law, and the economic cost of litigation time is very huge. In the judicial system, 94% of litigations reached directly through plea bargaining, and some world-renowned cases such as the Simpson Murder, reflect partly the failure of the jury system from the side.
The civil law system adopts a collegiate panel composed of professional judges, with one person, one vote, to ensure the professional conduct and fairness of judicial work.
The eleJudge system will adopt a professional judge system, select qualified judges through DAO, and establish a professional judge team database.
When there is a dispute between related parties, any related party initiates a trial request. After the trial request is initiated, the smart contract system will randomly select 9 judges who have submitted the pledge deposit and are waiting for the trial. The 9 judges need to complete the trial within 7 days.
During the trial period, the judges can organize texts, pictures, videos, on-site and other methods to openly communicate with the parties to the contract. The parties to the contract submit materials, and the judges make judgments based on the existing materials, but they cannot be related to the contract. The party made a punitive judgment on the grounds of not participating in the meeting.
After the judgesany one of the judges can initiate the conclusion of the trial. The trial conclusion states the amount to be paid and will openly communicate with the parties involved in the contract, received by the parties. After the trial conclusion is passed by a majority of votes by 9 judges, the Smart Contract pays the amount to each party.
The system provides financial incentives for judges’ trial time, but if there are judges who are unable to submit the last proposal within the specified time limit (if the last proposal is submitted at the end of the specified time limit, there will be a 24-hour extension period. New proposals can no longer be proposed within) vote, the smart contract will automatically confiscate the judges’ deposits that have not been proposed, and disqualify the judges, and the trial will be passed with the majority of the judges’ proposals without opposition, if all trials The judges have always been unable to reach a consensus (the majority is opposed), and the certainty of the judgment result cannot be maintained. This causes the cost of social disputes to increase. The smart contract will automatically confiscate the deposits of all judges in the trial. The parties involved in the contract may choose to initiate another trial to resolve the dispute.
Considering that most contracts may involve privacy issues, the system will provide an encryption method for storage of signed documents and other materials involved. The parties involved in the contract need to keep the key, and the system will also provide verification tools to verify the consistency of the ciphertext and the plaintext.
Considering that the contract payer may take the initiative to communicate privately with the judges to reach a bribery situation, increase the contract amount by 1% of the integrity fund. Before the trial is initiated, if one of the nine judges finds that the contract payer has private communication, Integrity money can be deprived.
Consider that the judge may take the initiative to communicate privately with the parties involved in the contract to achieve the purpose of soliciting bribes. If this happens, the user can apply to complain to the DAO organization. The DAO organization will publish the information of the judge and delete the qualification of the judge according to the situation.
The trial power of contract disputes is determined by the judges, and the DAO organization has no right to interfere.
The DAO organization will decide the candidates of judges by voting. In order to prevent voters from acting out of self-interest, the DAO organization should try its best to meet the requirements of diversity and decentralization.
Consider that the payer may transfer the pledged funds through one of the related parties to avoid contract responsibility. The system should not support the payer to reach an agreement with a single related party. Therefore, the user should consider the difficulty of coordination between the related parties when signing the contract. Try to separate the signing of multiple contract documents.
Considering that the token payer may increase the number of payment coins during the operation of the contract, the system needs to provide an entrance for the payer to increase the number of pledge token.
Consider that in the execution of the contract, there will be contract documents and intermediary signature documents, which may involve multiple parties or one party’s signature, and the entire process is recorded.
All files are stored in ipfs mode to ensure that all files cannot be tampered with.
We encourage contractual parties to resolve minor differences on their own, because the social cost of self-resolving is actually the lowest, but contractual parties may frequently initiate trial requests due to minor differences, causing the judges to be overwhelmed. Therefore, the system will pay a trial fee of 2% of the contract amount for the contract that initiates the trial. (The specific ratio should be adapted to the type of contract)
Judges equally divide the trial money as remuneration (may consider converting part of the DAO organization rewards into judge remuneration in the future), and judges can accept up to 3 trial cases at the same time.
All contracts that go through the eleJudge system will retain 0.5% of the funds as a reward for the DAO organization.
Considering the size of the contract, there should be changes in the number of judges in the future, with a minimum of 1 (a small amount of simple contract) and a maximum of 15 people. Considering that only one judge will have possible personal interests (it is easier to eliminate personal interests under multi-person communication), the system should try to adopt a trial mode of at least 3 persons.
Considering the different types of contracts, there should be groups of judges in different languages and types in the future (the same judge can enter multiple groups).
Considering general contract scenarios such as shopping, in the future, general template interfaces can be made for merchants to access, forming a faster and more convenient dispute resolution mechanism.
The DAO organization should have greater authority to fulfill its vision of fairness and professionalism at the early stage of its establishment, but will it cause the judges to modify the trial results under the threat of the DAO organization? I think that more measures should be taken to restrict the power of the DAO organization after stabilization in the later period. For example, the DAO organization inspects the judges’ professional abilities only when they enter the venue, and only replaces them with fair standards after entering the venue. Even after the project is stabilized, the DAO organization can be completely deprived of its removal power, and only the judges will evaluate the judges themselves, and the qualifications of the judges will be automatically disqualified when they fall below a certain evaluation score.
The advantages of eleJudge compared to the traditional model:
1、Both parties to the contract transaction pledge funds to the smart contract. There is no central node problem of traditional institutions, there is no need to trust the DAO organization, and there will be no problems of loss of pledge funds. If there is no dispute, the parties involved in the contract shall pay all the amounts themselves. At this point, eleJudge is completely decentralized and trust-free.
2、In controversial situations, ordinary people may be closer to social justice, but because there is a huge cognitive gap between various professional categories in modern society, people without relevant professional knowledge try to judge complex professional issues. To a certain extent, it is quite Let’s try our luck, so we need professional judges, and whether professional judges are professional and fair enough must be determined by a person or organization. Therefore, there will be a problem of partially centralized nodes in this part.
3、In order to reduce the problems caused by centralized nodes, (1) In the organizational structure, eleJudge adopts a decentralized DAO organization form; and requires no one in the DAO organization to occupy 1/20 of the share. Use multiple voting methods to curb conflicts caused by personal interests. (2) In the distribution of rights, the judges decide the outcome of the case, and the DAO organization has no right to interfere. The DAO organization can only determine the candidates for the judges. And it can only prevent judges from accepting new cases, and cannot remove judges from existing cases.
4、Regardless of the outcome of the trial, the DAO organization cannot claim the contract amount as its own, and can only pass the trial and pay the contract amount between the parties involved in the contract.
5、The judges of eleJudge use the project trial money as the basis for charging. His trial efficiency will be greatly improved, and there is a maximum time limit, so eleJudge can accelerate the efficiency of handling social disputes.
6、All the above-mentioned processes, restrictions on power, and execution of penalties for unfulfilled obligations are all solidified by smart contracts, and no one can change them.
The eleJudge system uses decentralization instead of centralization, and programmatic instead of human governance, restricting the power of all parties. I believe it will be effective and fair for future economic disputes.
实现目标：
1、完成合同签订与纠纷处理机制；
2、完成去中心化自治；
时间节点：
L1阶段：完成DEMO测试版本，完成合同签订与支付流程。
L2阶段：完成基础的纠纷处理流程；
L3阶段：完成各类型和各项复杂情况下的纠纷处理流程。
项目成果：
eleJudge电子合同快速裁判系统
项目进度计划：
1、项目审核通过后，第一个月完成合同签订部分。
2、第二个月完成支付流程。
申请人：
SmeelyFeet
申请时间：
2021年6月15日
团队背景：
资深合约开发者1名，初级开发者1名，前端开发1名，UI设计1名
经费明细：
L1阶段1.5w
是否开源：
智能合约全部开源
收款钱包地址：
cfx:aak67nj9va3mgpuhkemnvzvdzjtm41xhayay7w7hdf
资料链接：
产品链接：
项目灵感来源：
现有的经济类纠纷，合同相关方纠纷解决成本较大，而且传统的诉讼流程较为漫长。我希望通过一种快速审判的机制，来保证合同相关方的合理利益诉求，以较小的成本解决纠纷。
L1阶段验收标准：
完成DEMO测试版本，Demo在不包括特殊情况下，可以走一遍最基础的合同签订与支付流程。
项目精益画布：
问题：1、第三方资金质押没有保障；2、合同纠纷处理流程漫长；3、解决纠纷处理时找关系，送人情的一部分社会问题；
解决方案：通过去中心化的质押资金，解决第三方倒闭的风险；通过智能合约的激励措施，解决纠纷处理流程漫长的问题；通过完全随机化的筛选机制和公开交流机制，解决利益交换与暗箱操作的问题；
关键指标：纠纷处理时长；用户数；合同金额；公正投诉比率；
独特的价值主张：目前已知的，应该没有同类产品；
门槛优势：成熟的开发团队与理念；
渠道：通过公正快速的纠纷处理能力吸引客户；
客户群体：加密世界居民；
成本结构：开发成本，代码审计成本；
收入来源：合同交易金额的一小部分抽成。
编号082 eleJudge电子合同快速裁判系统（建议修改）
1 Like
牛逼啊
看起来很不错
听起来很不错哦，不过专业的审判员判断标准能否以“申请+考核”的方式进行选拔呢？（1.是通过这种初步筛选过滤掉一部分高人气低水平的人员，避免劣币驱逐良币。2.我认为在没有规定具体考核方式前提下，开放的考核方式更难达到公平公正）
加油！
干就完了，加油！
我之前也有过类似得想法，我把我得想法作为一些补充，也许有所帮助
1：每个账号加一个《基础信用值》，每次仲裁申请，违约方将扣除一定得《信用值》，《信用值》跌破警戒线后，再签订合同，需要额外支付一定得原生token作为信用保证金，且每次签订合同双方可以查看对方账号得履约记录以及信用值，这样可以初步鉴定，对方账号是否是刷合同或者信用有瑕疵，来确定是否值得信赖。
2：为了防止刷合同或者是垃圾合同（意为无必要得或者金额基数极小得，因为现在区块链得技术不足以饱和支持），在每次签订合同时双方都应支付一定得原生token，有最小支付和大额合同按比例支付，按金额和合同期限挂钩（时间得考虑时因为一但引入仲裁，取证时间长跨度大，需要付出更多成本）
1 Like
初期，应该会采用这种申请+考核的方式。
刷垃圾合同，是需要付出资金成本的。如果恶意刷金额很小的垃圾合同，恶意发起审判请求，占用审判员时间，确实会存在问题。（这里确实应该考虑不同类型合同的金额限制，不同的审判员能接受的金额大小是不同的）
个人观点:不知道你如何理解 智能合约的。项目中引入了太多的人的参与，这和智能合约的优势是冲突的。智能合约，就是一段写在区块链上的代码，一旦某个事件触发合约中的条款，代码即自动执行。也就是说，满足条件就执行，不需要人为操控。引入太多人的操作岂不活回去了……
你这个不如我的这个方案:同态加密+混淆电路+博弈论或者MPC多放安全计算。用技术去解决人不信任的问题，而且评审的人怎么筛选，人家不干了，缺人了怎么办。技术取代人才是区块链去中心化精神！
用MPC多方安全计算怎么去判定合同结果？
我理解你的意思，你主要是说这套机制过于中心化了，但智能合约的优势并不只在于去中心化，他也可以用于明晰规则、界定流程、不可篡改，相比于完全去中心化，他可能是退步，但相比于现实，他是渐进式的进步。
这段时间，我也在思考更好的模式，可能也会在一定程度上降低中心化的程度。原来的机制为了确保专业，就需要引入专业的标准，而专业的标准需要由人或者组织来判定。但不同的组织、不同的人，对专业的标准其实是有很大的不同。不同的时代，标准也有不同。那选择什么样的标准，就是一个很大的难题。
我在考虑是否采用陪审团的模式。通过质押一定数量的治理币，保证审判员会支持DAO的前提下，提高审判员的数量，综合削弱审判员之间的意见分歧，自发地去发展审判员组织，并保持与时俱进，减少DAO组织的权力。
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没有后续的信息了嘛
她说的是安全隐私计算，做博弈和裁决
合同最有效的其实是法律效应，智能合约在这里感觉是强行车扯上关系的。
多方安全隐私计算只能在保障隐私的情况输出较为简单的计算结果，如何应用于合同文本、大量证据的裁决？
合同最有效的是法律效应，但并不是所有的事情都需要法院去裁定，有劳动纠纷，你可能只需要去仲裁，在淘宝买东西，你一般投诉淘宝就可以解决。那在加密世界，建立一套以加密世界为基础的快速裁判，解决现实世界的冗余手续，也会有很大的社会意义。
项目申请已收到，评审会议安排在2021年6月27日周日，下午2点30分，请申请人安排时间并参与会议。如果有时间变动或者有时间调整的需求，请及时与社区技术委员会联系。
合约做不了你说的这个
aragon法庭了解一下
司法权了解一下
提出疑问，但是鼓励创新项目，能为cfx带来新鲜血液是好事情。
理论上牛逼呀，作为一线人员，顶一个！